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INTRODUCTION
The recent controversy regarding Argentina’s dragging debt litigation
has revived the longstanding academic discussion about the need for plausible solutions for those countries attempting to address their unsustainable
debt burdens.1 The Argentinean crisis was exacerbated by a problem with
a holdout creditor group, who effectively refused to accept the same debt
write-down as other creditors in 2005 and 2010. Instead, the group sought
full payment of their claim through litigation in the New York courts, leading to a fresh default in 2014.2 While a multitude of issues came to light
during the fifteen-year battle that included both in-court litigation and outof-court negotiations, perhaps one of the most salient lessons from these
proceedings is that financial crises are not a thing of the past, and their
specter can usher in profound consequences regarding countries’ economic
and political stability.3 Moreover, the contentious nature of the Argentinian proceedings demonstrates the need for an institutionalized mechanism
for those instances in which a government cannot realistically pay its debts.
A better, more standardized debt resolution system could exist to preserve
the rights of creditors and debtor countries alike.4
*
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J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2016. I would like to thank Professor Charles
Mooney for his thoughtful guidance and feedback regarding this topic.
Bloomberg View, Editorial: Argentina’s Debt Deal Doesn’t Solve the Real Problem, NEW HAVEN REG.
(Mar. 1, 2016) http://www.nhregister.com/opinion/20160301/editorial-argentinas-debt-dealdoesnt-solve-the-real-problem.
Argentina’s Debt: At Last, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21693786-agreement-victory-countrys-new-president-argentina-reaches-deal-its.
See Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Approach, 9
LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 629, 629 (discussing how in developing economies like Turkey and Argentina, the predominance of government debt in international markets makes sovereign debt crises
like Turkey and Argentina into economy-wide financial crises).
Id. at 631; see also The Associated Press, Argentina and a Group of U.S. Holdout Creditors Announce a Deal
in a Longstanding Debt Standoff, Potentially Breaking an Impasse that Has Kept the South American Country on
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Although in Argentina’s case the parties were able to eventually reach a
resolution, the implications of a large-scale sovereign debt default in today’s
interdependent international financial system pose a serious systemic threat.
The mere prospect of these rippling consequences has already led to radical
changes in how debt is issued worldwide.5 Indeed, in 2016 the International Monetary Fund warned that if countries do not start acting in concert
towards some kind of common goals, the global economy “could be derailed” and urged countries to move “urgently” and “collectively” to boost
global growth prospects.6 Despite the cooperation urged by such statements, widespread uncertainty and disagreements among countries persist,
thus allowing uncertainty to loom over our increasingly globalized economy. As sovereign bonds become increasingly prevalent in the global capital
markets, the potential for a single nation’s debt default to trigger a larger
systemic collapse grows—mainly because as issuance of these bonds proliferates, the economic dependency between countries likewise increases.7
The contemporary Argentinian example and earlier crises in Greece
and Ecuador are all evidence of the serious costs that accompany the current inconsistent resolutions to sovereign debt processes.8 Unresolved sovereign debt issues carry huge costs, and have at once caused financial and
other damage to individual debtor nations, citizens, and creditors.9 When
countries’ external debt exceeds sustainable levels and the borrower state is
unable to service payments of principal and interest, there is no way for
creditors to force repayment by these sovereign nations, since there is no
legal framework under which to wind up a country, or seize and liquidate
its domestically-held assets.10 As a result, in addition to the IMF’s statements, there is a growing recognition within the sovereign debt markets for
a more dependable approach to the risks accompanying potential default,
and more specifically, for a mechanism that allows for consistency in sover-
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the Margins of International Credit Markets, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 29, 2016) http://nyti.ms/1nbSph0; Argentina’s Debt: At Last, supra note 2.
Bloomberg View, supra note 1.
Ngaire Woods, The Global Economy’s Stealth Resilience, PROJECT SYNDICATE, (Mar. 3, 2016)
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/g-20-shanghai-meeting-distributedgovernance-by-ngaire-woods-2016-03.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 95, 97 (2012) (“As global capital markets increasingly (and inevitably) embrace sovereign
bonds, the potential for a nation’s debt default to trigger a larger systemic collapse increases as
these relationships become even more linked.”)
See Jack Boorman, Alternative Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 23 CATO J. 59, 59 (2003) (arguing the extended process of bringing defaulted sovereign debt to resolution caused intolerable
economic losses in Ecuador); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law
Approach, J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV., 2 (2016) (enumerating mechanisms by which extended and
uncertain insolvent sovereign debt resolution harms all stakeholders).
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 2–3.
Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1483, 1487 (2004).
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eign debt restructuring across nations.11 However, the international financial system currently offers no established framework for the predictable
and orderly restructuring of sovereign debt, and the fact that debt is issued
in different manners in different jurisdictions simply exacerbates the problem.12 As Boorman notes, “[i]n the view of many, however, the costs incurred under the current international financial architecture are unnecessarily large and act to the detriment of both debtors and their creditors.13
There is clearly a need for change. As a result of the inefficiencies of the
current system and the increasing media and academic focus on these debtrestructuring issues, Professor Steven A. Schwarcz, a leader in the study of
sovereign debt and expert in the restructuring field, has recently crafted a
forthcoming proposal for a statutory framework.14 His innovative statutory
solution consists of a cross-jurisdictional model law. This law, if adopted by
at least two jurisdictions at a national or subnational level, would create
what Schwarcz believes to be the most legally and practically feasible
mechanism under which a sovereign debt restructuring could take place—
and due to the distribution of bondholders and governing law, his proposal
suggests that the law would be most successful if the United States enacted
it on a subnational level, through adoption in New York state.15
Though his proposal exhibits many benefits, and would, if adopted,
create a single comprehensive mechanism with which the international
markets could cohesively approach sovereign debt, his proposal nonetheless
raises some concerns with respect to its legal feasibility. In particular, the
law’s retroactive modification of creditors’ debt contracts, particularly those
being acted upon at a subnational level, is arguably in violation of the federal Contracts Clause,16 a provision of the U.S. Constitution that prohibits
states from enacting any legislation that impairs its citizens’ existing contractual obligations.17 In exploring the question of constitutionality, the
refutations and challenges contained in this paper are not meant to be criti-
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See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK (Apr.
26, 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf.
“Sovereign debt restructuring” is a term that refers to the processes that result in an adjustment of the principal amount
of treasury obligations, and seek to make a country’s debt sustainable. Sedlak, supra note 10 at
1491; see generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., United States Sovereign Debt: A Thought Experiment On Default And Restructuring 2 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-40,
2012) (discussing the unpredictable consequences of a hypothetical U.S. sovereign default).
Shalendra D. Sharma, Resolving Sovereign Debt: Collective Action Clauses or the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 627, 627 (2004).
Boorman, supra note 8, at 59.
See generally Schwarcz, supra note 7.
Id. at 11.
Alternatively, some literature refers to this clause as the “Contract Clause.” This paper will, for
convenience’s sake, refer to it consistently as the “Contracts Clause.”
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
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cisms, as Schwarcz’s model law is one of the most compelling examples of a
realistic, adaptable mechanism that could effect sovereign debt restructuring. However, this analysis seeks to show, through a historical approach,
that as Contracts Clause jurisprudence has evolved, it likewise follows that
the legal feasibility of such a law is perhaps less clean, and more open to
criticism, than Schwarcz’s initial proposal contemplates.
Part I of this paper will describe the legal and academic landscape surrounding sovereign debt restructuring and the problems that currently limit
the effectiveness of the contractual legal system. Part II will delve into solutions: specifically, it will explore Professor Schwarcz’s statutory proposal
and explain the benefits of his model law, which is arguably one of the few
mechanisms under which a cross-jurisdictional restructuring mechanism
could actually be effected. Part III will then address the constitutional issues that this model law approach creates, and explore Contracts Clause
jurisprudence to ascertain the law’s legal soundness. Using the lessons of
Part III, Part IV will address and refute the primary counterarguments that
the staunchest proponents of the model law could raise—namely, that there
is no mechanism with which creditors can challenge the law, and that a
court should uphold the model law on policy grounds. Part V, then, will
propose alternative policy strands that could be incorporated into the law,
and move towards a solution that could limit the unlimited universe of
creditors with standing, which may make the law a more legally appealing,
and constitutional, option.
I. SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A sovereign debt restructuring differs from a typical corporate restructuring in several key ways. Perhaps most notably, institutionalized mechanisms exist for the distribution of assets in a private corporate scenario, in
which creditors can force an insolvent corporation to liquidate and convey
its assets through the procedures of a bankruptcy court or other tribunal.18
And although some U.S. entities at the municipal level have special provisions for reorganization, a relatively tidy liquidation option, at the current
time, is unavailable when the debtor is sovereign at either a national or
subnational level.19 Further, the goal of a sovereign debt restructuring is
18
19

Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuting: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 956, 957–58 (2000).
With regard to a subnational bankruptcy, some politicians and academics, including Schwarcz
and David Skeel, have suggested that Congress should extend federal bankruptcy regimes to the
states, but even in such a case it would likely not bring about a liquidation under Chapter 7 (as
practically speaking, this seems implausible), but would likely take more of the flavor of a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, or an extension of Chapter 9 (which covers municipal bankruptcies). See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677,
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only reorganization of the debt, and the safety valve of liquidation is not an
exit option for a debtor state, even those in the most inherently “bad” financial situations.20 Beginning in the 1980s and continuing into the twenty
first century, there has been a rise in the number of debtor countries seeking relief for debt burdens, and among these parties are some of the largest
debtors worldwide—yet “[s]overeign debt restructuring is a problem that
has been ignored for quite some time”21 despite the earlier discussed integration of global markets and accompanying criticisms of bailouts.22
Practically speaking, if a sovereign debtor shows itself willing to meet its
debts when it becomes possible, it is in the interests of all the creditors to
maintain their relationship with the debtor-state and negotiate a workable
solution. Like a bankruptcy-based reorganization, in which agreement on a
plan is rewarded while failure to agree is penalized, the most efficient forms
of sovereign debt restructuring are those that are consensual.23 That said,
reaching this consensus is a “haphazard affair.”24 Achievement of those
consensual aspects of a plan is often undermined by the parties’ interests:
the debtor-state and its creditors necessarily are in conflict, which often
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these two parties to reach agreement
on a single restructuring plan, let alone which legal framework to apply.25
Beyond this, there are often intercreditor disagreements, which signal another problem that can arise at virtually any stage of a restructuring and
derail the process.26
Although the advocacy and involvement of the International Monetary
Fund is importantly symbolically, as it is a multilateral government entity
attempting to aid in the process of sovereign debt restructuring, its involvement has only further complicated the situation. A bailout by the
IMF is one mechanism with which a distressed company can find relief,27
but this solution remains controversial because in bailouts the Fund is acting as “a lender of last resort” to financially troubled states.28 The IMF’s

20
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694 (2012); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State ‘Bankruptcy’, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 322, 325–26 (2011).
Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 959, n.7 (noting that no conversion similar to that in a corporate
bankruptcy is within the realm of consideration for a sovereign restructuring) (citing Sachs, infra
note 31).
Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1514.
See Graeme F. Rea, Restructuring Sovereign Debt—Will There be New International Law and Institutions?,
77 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 312 (1983) (describing the ad hoc processes and complications of
stabilizing insolvent governments).
Id. at 312.
Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 959
Id. at 959–60.
For instance, see the holdout problem that exists within the Collective Action Clause solution to
restructuring, supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 630.
Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 961.
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lending practice has created what has been labeled a risk of “moral hazard,” a scenario in which countries hoping for an IMF bailout will fail to
undertake a prudent economic course, as they will be protected from default and thus can engage in unwarranted financial risk without any meaningful oversight.29 Though the IMF has imposed conditions of fiscal responsibility through lending practices (mainly through an approach known as
“conditionality”) such attempts to alleviate moral hazard sometimes fail,
and the problem persists.30 In a criticism of the IMF’s role in debt
workouts, and in recommending an overhaul of its lending practices, Jeffrey
Sachs states “[t]he IMF’s own tactics—and failure to act like a bankruptcy
manager—help to breed failures.”31
Currently, uncertainty surrounds every aspect of the sovereign debt restructuring process.32 As the above debates show, restructuring sovereign
debt is a difficult subject, one that is open to criticism on multiple fronts and
presents several layered political and social questions. Some such questions
include: At what point does a country decide that its debt is unsustainable?
Once it does reach this conclusion, why is any one particular mechanism
the proper one to restructure that debt? What parties have a stake in the
proceedings, and how involved should the official international community
be in the eventual restructuring?33 And while “[d]ebt can almost always be
serviced in some abstract sense, through additional taxation and through
the diversion of yet more domestic production to exports to generate the
revenue and foreign exchange needed to service the debt,” there is a
threshold question regarding whether a large-scale debt restructuring is ever appropriate, as well as what parties should be able to force, or prevent,
the restructuring’s results.34 Further, a debtor state’s decision is even more
complicated by the fact that it cannot restructure its debt completely unilaterally without suffering “reputational cost in the world financial community.”35 Resulting from these political uncertainties is the need for the debt
servicing mechanism to be effective in not only restructuring the debt, but
to also to garner the support and endorsement of the international community. This approval necessarily includes that of the International Monetary

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 962.
Id. at 963.
Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1995, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?, Princeton University Frank
D. Graham Lecture (Apr. 20, 1995), http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:8279.
Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 630.
Boorman, supra note 8, at 60.
Id. at 61.
Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1192 (2004);
Sachs,supra note 31; see also Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 101 (recognizing unilateral debt reorganization as an alternative to bilateral debt restructuring, but noting that “[t]he nation may well suffer
reputational consequences, and any national assets (such as ships or airplanes) outside the nation’s jurisprudence might be able to be seized.”)
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Fund, who will likely still need to commit resources to continue to assist the
debtor country, regardless of the Fund’s own role in complicity allowing
governments to remain in financial distress.36
Because the current system lacks consistency and cohesion, academics
have debated what resolution framework is the best mechanism to institutionalize widely and consistently, and there is, remarkably, “widespread
agreement for a revamped sovereign debt restructuring process.”37 Though
some radical mechanisms and discussions exist, and have ranged from strict
court-supervised international bankruptcy regimes,38 to systems modeled on
railroad receiverships,39 to even more freewheeling, completely decentralized approaches,40 the primary academic debate centers on either adopting
a cross-border regime of either a contractual or a statutory nature. This divide is sometimes identified as a difference drawn between public law,
which is embodied through a statutory approach that would require
agreement across states, versus the private law solutions, which could be
undertaken unilaterally, and take the form of individual collective action
clauses.41
The private law solution to address sovereign debt restructuring is contractual, and treats each issuance of debt as its own distinct contract and,
therefore, subject to its own terms. This approach provides a certain process to restructure debt, the lack of which currently prevents investors from
adequately assessing the cost of default.42 Often, issued debt instruments
contain collective action clauses, or CACs. The CAC approach is described as “voluntary and market based” and is contingent on the inclusion
of these various clauses in individual bond instruments, leaving jurisdiction
to the courts in which the instrument was issued.43 Proponents of this contractual approach often extol the virtues of market-based solutions, and policy proposals in this arena encourage creditors and debtors to actively en-
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Boorman supra note 8, at 61.
Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 631.
Jeffrey Sachs proposed an international bankruptcy regime modeled on Chapter 11 of the US
Bankruptcy code to provide insolvent countries the same protection from creditors as private
firm. See Sharma, supra note 12, at 628.
See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Out of the Past: Railroads & Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 35 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 845, 845–46 (2004) (suggesting many analogies and parallels between the options for
bankruptcy proceedings for railroads and sovereign nations, since both structures operate in the
absence of a statutory framework and do not have a liquidation as an exit option, a railroad receivership proceeding could plausibly be adapted for a sovereign nation with certain limitations.)
See Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 649 (detailing a CAC-modifying proposal by the U.S. Undersecretary John B. Taylor).
Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 1190.
Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1499 (“With no process in place, investors are unable to adequately assess the cost of default. Without this information, not only are bonds priced inaccurately, but
great uncertainty ensues when a country has debts that are unmanagemeable.”)
Boorman, supra note 8, at 65.
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gage in altering the terms under which countries borrow money.44 Suggested mechanisms for improvement of this system would allow for the
broadening of the use of these CACs in order to allow the holders of the
debt to understand more clearly its relationship with the debtor for the restructuring of those claims.45 Further, some proposals contain initiation
and engagement clauses, which are designed to attack the minority holdout
problem and uncertainties about procedure.46 The traditional form of a
CAC provides for majority enforcement and majority restructuring provisions, which have been in use for some time, and have received attention as
being likely to deserve wider use.47
In this system, however, there is a collective action problem that has
worsened significantly among creditors as debtor states have begun borrowing more money from bond investors.48 This has led to the holdout problem discussed earlier with respect to Argentina: when facing a plan of reorganization, one or more creditor groups can prevent a consensual plan
from being reached in the hope that the need to reach an agreement becomes so powerful that other parties will buy out the holdout claims or pay
them a premium.49 U.S. Courts have even recognized, in some instances,
that such behavior is permissible in the sovereign debt context.50 Therefore, at each stage of a contractual sovereign debt restructuring, problems
plague the readjustment of debt claims to the detriment of the non-holdout
creditors as well as the debtor.51
There is a current movement towards better formulated, more viable
steps that address these problems, such as when contingency clauses are
added, which could aggregate creditor claims for voting purposes, or authorize a trustee of a bondholder syndicate to act as a representative in a
restructuring.52 However, little progress has come out of these ambitious
initiatives, and any continued efforts largely appear to mimic the effects and
role of a statutory solution to the problem. Although the consistent inclusion of such clauses would be an improvement over the state of affairs,
there is a question whether this approach even goes far enough in effecting
an orderly restructuring, especially because of the lack of uniformity of lan44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52

Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1498.
Boorman, supra note 8, at 60.
Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1500.
Boorman, supra note 8, at 65.
Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 960.
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 98.
Id. (citing the opinion in Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir. 1985), in which a member of a bank syndicate held out in an agreement with Costa Rican
sovereign debtors and the court granted summary judgment on the theory that the loan was
clearly due and payable).
Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 961.
See Boorman, supra note 8, at 65, 67 (describing the movement towards more ambitious contingency clauses).
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guage across jurisdictions and bond instruments.53 It should be noted that
restructurings in Ecuador and the Ukraine demonstrated that a restructuring is possible under this voluntary contractual agreement system.54
II. ONE STATUTORY APPROACH: A MODEL LAW AS A MEANS TO
RESTRUCTURE SOVEREIGN DEBT
As a result of these collective action problems presented by the contractual approach, numerous parties, including the IMF, have voiced support
for some statutory creation that would function like a consistent, international bankruptcy regime.55 Generally speaking, a well-designed statutory
solution is largely preferable to a contractual one. A statutory solution
would allow a sovereign the ability to bind its minority creditors under the
power of law, thereby addressing the holdout problem and enabling the
debtor-states to restructure debt free of this concern.56 Thus, the desire to
reduce the social costs of sovereign debt has led toward a movement pursuing a systematic legal resolution framework, one that takes the form of a
cross-jurisdictional statute that can help debtor states restructure unsustainable sovereign debt.57
Once-IMF Director Anne Kreuger stated, in a proposal for a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism, that the most important element of any new
restructuring framework would be a mechanism to allow a qualified majority of creditors to bind minority creditors.58 The IMF proposed its own
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, one that was formally designed
to move away from the messy contractual approach and instead organize
creditors and countries in an effort to restructure their debt in an orderly
and timely manner,59 but the idea never gained traction and has been
largely abandoned.60 As a result, the contractual, market based approach
has become the status quo, though calls for a formal restructuring mecha-

53
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Boorman, supra note 8, at 65–67.
Arora & Caminal, supra note 3, at 637.
Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1491; Bloomberg View, supra note 1; see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A
Framework for a Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The KISS Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid)
and Other Guiding Principles, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 57, 60 (2015)(discussing the continued need for a
formal restructuring mechanism notwithstanding the rejection of the IMF’s SDRM proposal and
widespread use and acceptance of CACs).
Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1493–94.
Richard Gitlin & Brett House, A Blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Forum, 27 CIGI PAPERS 5, 5 (2014).
Sedlak, supra note 10, at 1494 (quoting Anne O. Kreuger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
Int’l
Monetary
Fund,
at
14
(2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf at 2 (internal quotes omitted)).
See Arora, supra note 3, at 633.
Mooney, supra note 55, at 58 (“The proposal received support, but was eventually abandoned”
citing its reasons for its abandonment as, inter alia, the opposition of the United States and the
private sector).
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nism have not ceased, and have, in light of the Eurozone crisis, actually resurged.61
In response to recent financial crises, a similar, contemporary proposal
comes from Professor Steven L. Schwarcz: across borders, states would
adopt a model law to achieve a voluntary resolution framework within their
jurisdictions.62 Such an approach, he argues, would reduce the need for
sovereign debt bailouts by organizations like the IMF, which he calls “costly” and the main cause of the aforementioned “moral hazard” issue.63 Further, Schwarcz claims that a model law approach would “reduce the risk of
systemic contagion” from a debtor-state’s default, an important goal in today’s interdependent financial system.64
Schwarcz arrived at this statutory approach after observing the system
of CACs, which he labels a “deeply dysfunctional” approach that “produces bad law,”65 and noting that the more sustainable and consistent model
laws are not unprecedented in cross-jurisdictional lawmaking.66 His proposal points out how CACs are insufficient to solve the holdout problem, as
many sovereign debt contracts lack them, and still require unanimity to effect a restructuring.67 Further, even in those contracts that contain CACs,
the requirements are so high that the holdouts come about in another fashion, and such contracts are only binding to the contract parties.68 In sum,
radically improved CACs, such as those proposed by the International
Capital Market Association in August 2014, are insufficient to address the
immediacy of the problem at hand.69
It is at this point in his proposal that Schwarcz asserts that a model law
would be the preferable approach, since each participating government will
adopt the law and take its own individual requisite steps to make it effective,

61
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63
64
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Mooney, supra note 55, at 60.
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 6.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6. Schwarcz cites, as precedent, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration as an example of an international insolvency law, while the Uniform Commercial
Code is an example of a subnational model law that was uniformly enacted on a multi-state level.
See also United Nations, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (establishing a model law regularizing arbitration
as a method of settling disputes in the international commercial markets).
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 3.
Id. (“Even in sovereign debt contracts that include CACs, the supermajority requirement may be
so high (e.g. three-quarters) that vulture funds are able to purchase vote-blocking positions that
enable them to act as holdouts”).
See id. at 4 (“Even if all new sovereign debt contracts were to include aggregate-voting CACs, it
will be many years before existing debt contracts, which do not include them, are paid off.”)
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while still adhering to the same, or close to the same legislative text.70 As
opposed to a convention, a model law permits the texts of the laws to vary,
while also allowing any enacted laws to be amended by member states unilaterally if the need so arises.71 For this reason, a model law approach is arguably preferable to adhering to a convention, which is a legal tool that is
legally very similar to a cross-border treaty. Though a convention would
similarly require each member state to adhere to its requirements, and in
most cases are preferable to model laws because they are binding upon the
nations, who cannot renege on their agreements,72 such certainty is less
preferable in the current instance. In most situations in which a country is
experimenting with new proposals,73 model laws can have broad acceptance and tweaks that a strict convention does not allow, and if a state
wants to modify or denounce a model law, it can do so on a smaller state or
subnational level, which would not violate international law.74
The structure of Schwarcz’s model law is meant to provide effective
mechanisms for a restructuring while reducing the social costs of a debt crisis, systemic risk, creditor uncertainty, and the need for bailouts.75 He
achieves this though applying the law retroactively and overriding any contractual provisions inconsistent with “any contractual provisions that are
inconsistent with the provisions of this [l]aw.”76 The law is invoked by voluntary petition, and immediately notifies all creditors of the state’s intention
to negotiate a plan.77 The law outlines a binding voting structure in its
Chapter III, Article 778 as well as terms of Lending and a Priority Scheme
in its Chapter IV, Articles 8 and 9.79 All disputes under the law are resolved by binding arbitration through an international court.80

70

71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78

79

See Schwarcz, supra note 18, (noting that Professor Schwarcz has alternatively argued for the
adoption of an international convention in 1999–2000); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Idiot’s Guide to
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1192 (2004) (concluding that a statutory approach
is the most preferable and effective way of effecting a restructuring in); see also Schwarcz, supra
note 7, at 97 (suggesting that the model approach is the next line of scholarship for Schwarcz).
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., “Extraterritorial Impact of Choice of Law Rules for Non-United States
Debtors Under Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 and a New Proposal for International Harmonization,” in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND INSOLVENCY (Michael Bridge &
Robert Stevens eds., Oxford University Press 2001).
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 6–7.
Id.
See Mooney, supra note 71, at 202.
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 13.
Id. at 24, 35.
Id. at 36.
See id. at 37 (“A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least [two-thirds] in
amount and more than [one-half] in number of the claims of such class [voting on such Plan]
[entitled to vote of such Plan] agree to the Plan,” noting how selecting those actually voting on
the plan can more easily lead to Plan approval).
Id. at 38 (“Subject to Article 8(3), the State shall have the right to borrow money on such terms
and conditions as it deems appropriate”; “The State shall repay loans approved under Article 8
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Rather than advocating for large-scale, multi-member adoption of his
model law, Schwarcz instead proposes the enactment to be limited to one
or two jurisdictions.81 More specifically, because either New York or English law governs most sovereign debt contracts, Schwarcz believes one or
both of those jurisdictions should adopt his model law, with one state’s
adoption incentivizing the other to similarly adopt.82
III. THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY OF THIS MODEL LAW APPROACH
In his proposal, Schwarcz maintains that even despite the retroactive
application of the model law, it is nonetheless within the scope of legal feasibility—because it rests its constitutionality on an exercise of New York’s
police powers, its retroactive features would be constitutionally justified.83
Looking to precedent, the Model Law cleanly relies on the Supreme
Court’s 1934 decision Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, an opinion that does
indeed speak of the legal standard that upholds otherwise unconstitutional
acts in the name of the police power.84 Schwarcz claims that the state of
New York could effectively frame its law to meet the five factor test the
Court first recognized in Blaisdell, which allowed the law in that instance to
survive a Contracts Clause challenge.85 As he states, any law enacted as an
exercise of a state’s police powers would have to (1) address a grave temporary economic emergency, (2) protect a basis societal interest, not a favored
group, (3) provide relief—in the form of supermajority aggregate voting for
debt relief and temporary funding—that is appropriately tailored to the
emergency it is enacted to address, (4) impose reasonable conditions, and
(5) be limited in its application to the duration of the economic emergency.86 Schwarcz also says that “[m]ore recent jurisprudence suggests [that]
even more leeway” could be granted to laws that normally would be subject
to a Contracts Clause challenge,87 and that such leeway granted may be
even greater if the constitutional impairment is “not substantial.”88

80
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88

prior to paying any other claims. . . . The claims of creditors of the State are subordinated to the
extent needed to effectuate the priority payment under this Article 9.”)
See id. (“All disputes under this Law shall be resolved by binding arbitration before a panel of
three arbitrators.”)
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5, 25–26 n.137–38 and accompanying text (“Such a statute would survive a Contracts
Clause challenge if it . . . [he then lists the Blaisdell factors]”).
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Id. at 444–47.
Id.
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 26 n.133 (citing Healthnow N.Y. Inc. v. N.Y. State Ins. Dept., 110
A.D. 3d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013) (noting that “this case, however, is a state
court decision.”))
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 26 n.134 (citing Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 411 (1983)).

June 2017]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MODEL LAW APPROACH

1219

On this foundation, Schwarcz states “New York . . . should be able to
frame its enactment of the [m]odel [l]aw in such a way as to not violate the
Contracts Clause” and it therefore should meet the U.S. Supreme Court’s
criteria to survive a Contracts Clause challenge.89 The questions about the
law’s legal feasibility, however, do not end here. Although Schwarcz is correct in recognizing that the Supreme Court rejected a Contracts Clause
challenge in Blaisdell in part on account of the economic emergency posed
by the Depression, courts seem likely to treat invocations of emergency
more skeptically when made in service to the state’s own self-interest.90
And although it is indeed possible his law may comport with the emergency
powers doctrine presented in Blaisdell, the narrowness of the exception may
yet undermine his law’s feasibility. Further, a historical survey of Contracts
Clause jurisprudence shows how challenges to the Clause, and exceptions
found, rarely predictably align with precedent, and instead are highly subject to the social climate under which the challenge is raised. In addition,
there is a question as to whether a state even has the ability to enact a subnational insolvency law, or whether the evolution of the Bankruptcy Clause
would redistribute such power elsewhere.
A. Blaisdell and Emergency Powers Exception
The model law’s clean reliance on the Blaisdell factor understates the
complexity of the constitutional legal landscape that would allow a state law
to be immune from a Contracts Clause challenge, and fails to mention the
accompanying heightened judicial scrutiny that the state, in enacting a selfserving model law, would realistically receive. Further, the law’s reliance
on solely the Blaisdell case understates the illusive nature of the opinion and
the uncertainties it contained, as “[m]any scholars consider [Blaisdell] an
aberration in Contract[s] Clause jurisprudence and contend its emphasis
upon flexible judicial interpretation and the wide latitude of state police
powers undermined the security of vested contract rights.”91 Of particular
concern is the Model Law’s retroactivity, which Schwarcz himself notes
that this could raise an enforceability concern under domestic subnational
law,92 noting how this particular feature of the law could render it as being
a violation of the Contracts Clause.
At the time Blaisdell bubbled up to the courts, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was president, over four thousand banks had failed, the national in-

89
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Id. at 25.
Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL. 117, 134 (2012).
Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical Study of contract Clause
Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 515 (1993).
Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 25.
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come had been halved, over a quarter of the work force was idle, and all
areas of the economy were close to failure.93 In response to the wave of
farm foreclosures that this economic state entailed, Minnesota passed a law
under which mortgagers who were unable to make their payments were
permitted to turn to state courts to alter their payment schedules.94 The
economic climate was highly uncertain, and the need for some kind of financial act was become all the more apparent.
Contextualism, then, is the basic premise underlying the Blaisdell decision. Justice Hughes’ majority opinion reveals that that the constitutional
provision in question should be interpreted not in the abstract, but both
within “the context of the entire Constitution,” as well as that of “the social
situation confronting the Court”—in other words, the same constitutional
provisions “may mandate different results in similar cases arising at different points in history.”95 As a result, the text of the Blaisdell opinion is highly
suggestive that the case was decided wholly within the tumultuous economic and social climate under which it arose, with Hughes stating,
“[e]mergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted
or reserved,” and that an emergency may justify the use, even if not the existence of the police power.96 The Great Depression (the “emergency” Hughes
was alluding to) served as the grounds under which the opinion rests.
Though Hughes also recognizes that the law in question is exactly the kind
of law that the Contracts Clause, and framers sought to prevent,97 his holding nonetheless expressed the belief that some degree of impairment was
nonetheless constitutionally permissible. And indeed, the ability for the
court to exercise any emergency power, “thus transcending the carefully
crafted textual boundaries emplaced on government actors, is [likely] implicit within the structure of the Constitution.”98 Because precedent was
not “directly applicable to the question” before the court “in view of the
conditions with which the Minnesota statute seeks to safeguard the interests
of the mortgagee-purchaser,” the Court instead looked to cases under
which the economic interests of the state “may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with
contracts.”99
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Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, & Sag: Why Blaisdell was a Harsher Blow to Liberty than Korematsu, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1302 (2005).
Charles A. Bieneman, Note, Legal Interpretation and a Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2534, 2537 (1992).
Id. at 2534.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–26 (1934).
Id. at 428–29.
Kahan, supra note 93, at 1286.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434, 437.
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Some scholarship argues that Blaisdell’s interpretation of the Contracts
Clause is legally baseless, and was instead applied only due to the “[s]trong
social pressures to uphold the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium [that] undeniably existed.”100 Minnesota’s law was intended to give creditors what
the mortgagors could pay, and did not wholly abrogate (even if it did impair) the mortgagors’ obligation on the contract. However, the finelyworded Contracts Clause leaves no gap in interpretation to shoehorn this
policy perspective in—“[w]ere the clause vague or ambiguous, a Court
might find gaps allowing it interpretive leeway.”101 This reading of Blaisdell
suggests that the Contracts Clause paid little to no attention to the positive
law at the time, and was therefore exclusively appropriate for the mortgagors and creditors in the Great Depression, but likely should not be widely
applicable in other contexts.
Clearly, the list of factors that the court set out is evidence of efforts to
narrowly construe the Blaisdell opinion.102 The state’s action “must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate to the emergency”103 and the relief “must have reasonable relation to the legitimate end to which the State
is entitled to direct its legislation,”104 and such relief would be considered
unconstitutional if it was “neither temporary nor conditional” and contained “no limitations as to time, amount, circumstances, or need.”105
The Court has allowed for this emergency exception for regulations that
are needed to preserve “what is best for the body politic in the long run”
and such benefits can “prevail over the interests of particular individuals.”106 And though it is true that the Supreme Court has at times granted
inalienable police powers an expansive interpretation, it is not certain that
such leeway would be similarly given to those regulations simply meant to
relieve a state from its own economic debt, especially if, as Justice Sutherland claims in his dissent to Blaisdell, the Contracts Clause serves the “studied purpose of preventing legislation designed to relieve debtors especially in
time of distress”107 Blaisdell did not address whether economic interests are
included in the powers protecting the public welfare, though the Court did
explicitly state that the state’s reserved powers could not be construed to allow a state to repudiate its debts.108 Moreover, there is some skepticism
100
101
102

103
104
105
106
107
108

Bieneman, supra note 94, at 2561.
Id. at 2563.
Olken, supra note 91, at 595. (“As a whole, these cases demonstrate the perception of the Chief
Justice and other members of the Blaisdell majority about the limitations of their decision. Hughes,
in particular, did not intend to eviscerate the constitutional protection of vested contract rights.”)
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 434.
Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949).
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934).
Id. at 439.
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about this “‘pure’ economic state of emergency, [which,] though relatively
unknown before the twentieth century, is now invoked as a justification by
both left- and right-wing governments seeking to pursue widely disparate
economic policies.”109
For contrast, the court has recognized public health as being a legitimate
concern, and other obvious emergencies, like remedying the immediate nuisance of flooding, as permissible exercises of states’ police powers.110 However,
“[u]nlike legislation for the preservation of health and moral welfare, most of
which fit within a traditional notion of governmental responsibility, laws that
sought to alter the allocation of economic resources, or otherwise subject vested
contract rights to the exigencies of economic change, raised critical questions
about the permissible scope of state regulation under the Contract[s]
Clause.”111

Under this framework, in order to fall within the emergency powers exception articulated by Blaisdell, the model law faces a few hurdles. Although
the holding in Blaisdell is an instance in which a law was seen as a valid exercise of states police powers and immune from a Contracts Clause challenge, it was based on the very tenuous, narrow, policy-driven exception to
the rule. And although Schwarcz’s model law has the general well being of
the public at its core, the law is not necessarily serving those public safety
and policy goals typically associated with the Contracts Clause. Further,
though the economic climate is difficult and getting worse, the law, if
broadly applied, does not appear to be enacted pursuant to any single particular emergency. Most importantly, the method of adoption here—a
state-enacted law with procedures for restructuring—is not temporary.
The fact that such questions even exist within this uncertain legal landscape
suggests that perhaps Schwarcz’s model law may be subject to constitutional challenges, even if under this Blaisdell standard alone.
B. Contracts Clause Jurisprudence in a Historical Context
The Court’s later opinions further this idea that the Constitution may
be less tolerant of these economically centered, state-enacted statutes, since,
“[i]f a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to
spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the
Contract[s] Clause would provide no protection at all.”112 Coupled with
this fact, and as the socially-focused, policy-based decision in Blaisdell is evidence of, “the value of precedent as a prediction of outcomes in contracts

109
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112

Kahan, supra note 93, at 1284.
See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 484 (1905).
Olken, supra note 91, at 545.
U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
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clause cases is questionable.”113 Strengthening this uncertainty is Contracts
Clause jurisprudence, which, both before and after Blaisdell, is characterized
more by unpredictability than Schwarcz’s proposal would lead his audience
to believe. Indeed, “conflicts between law and politics have frequently
dominated the Court’s contracts clause jurisprudence, and as a result the
treatment of precedent that masks the political choices of another time is
misleading and confusing.”114 Court jurisprudence after Blaisdell suggests a
less lenient approach to broadly applicable exceptions based on police powers, and especially economic exceptions, which paves a rocky path for the
model law’s success. A historical analysis of the Contracts Clause shows the
fluctuating standards in the Court’s interpretation of the scope of the emergency powers exception, but more importantly, that there is no uniform test
to determine whether a Contracts Clause violation can be sustained. As
long as this uncertainty remains in American law, it may undermine any
scenario in which two jurisdictions will voluntarily enact the model law,
thereby defeating it as a feasible mechanism to restructure sovereign debt.
At various points in its history, the Contracts Clause has been considered
a dormant part of the Constitution, with some scholars noting, “few constitutional provisions have had such a profound impact on American law and
have undergone such a dramatic decline as the Contract[s] Clause.”115 Historically, the Contracts Clause developed in response to debt-relief laws,
which frustrated the enforcement of contracts and threatened the rights of
many property owners—its “original task was to restore stability” and sanctity to these contracts.116 Because state protection towards contracts was considered inadequate, the Clause was incorporated into the Constitution at the
Convention. Though the circumstances surrounding its initial adoption and
ratification were “shrouded in mystery,”117 which “highlights [its] inherent
ambiguity,”118 it nonetheless served as “one of the only protections against
state interference with contractual obligations.”119
The Clause experienced a heyday in the Marshall Court, which treated
it as a “muscular restraint on state authority,” before being more narrowly
applied by Justice Taney, who used it more as a means of affording states
more policymaking power.120 At first, the Contracts Clause was understood
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

J. Michael Veron, The Contracts Clause and the Court: A View of Precedent and Practice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 54 TUL. L. REV. 117, 119–20 (1979).
Id.
James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 371
(2010).
Michael Cataldo, Revival or Revolution: U.S. Trust’s Role in the Contracts Clause Circuit Split, 87 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2013).
Ely, supra note 115, at 373.
Olken, supra note 91, at 519.
Cataldo, supra note 116, at 1145.
Id. at 1148.
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as “primarily as a constraint on legislative impairment of private contracts—
that is, to prevent states from intervening on behalf of private debtors
against their creditors. Beginning with Fletcher v. Peck, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear the Contracts Clause protects public contracts” as well.121 As a result of this broadening, the Clause now protected
agreements between states and individuals as well as private contracts, and
courts felt free in applying the Clause’s provisions to tax-exemption agreements, grants of corporate charters, land grants, agreements between states,
and state insolvency laws.122 The clause was narrowed, however, through
the case of Ogden v. Saunders, in which the Supreme Court held that the
Contracts Clause was directed at only laws that retroactively interfered with
contracts,123 suggesting that the Clause was in place to protect rights that
already existed, rather than expand or circumscribe the right to contract.124
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Clause steadily declined, and
the Court found no violations of the provision between 1941–1977, leading
to the Court’s necessary insistence, by 1978, that “the Contract[s] Clause
remains part of the Constitution. It is not a dead letter.”125 Perhaps as a result of this, many litigants are “unsure of the scope of the scope of the
Clause’s power,” yet its text presents a substantial barrier to any type of legislation that impairs existing contractual modification, particularly the contracts of those creditors that are modified without their consent.126 As mentioned earlier in this paper, the limits of the clause run up against the state’s
inalienable police powers as first articulated in Stone v. Mississippi,127 powers
that prohibit a state from contracting away its ability to protect those within
its borders or to promote or protect the public commonwealth and economic
activity within its borders, even if an exercise of such power impairs existing
contracts.128 Later jurisprudence revealed that, although states have the ability to modify their own contracts, that power is not unlimited—state governments can impair their own contracts without violating the Clause if they institutionalize impairment is sufficiently justified by public policy goals.129
Since U.S. Trust, impairment, on its own, is not enough for a sustainable
violation., or in the inverse, states can create constitutionally-sound im121
122
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Johnson & Young, supra note 90, at 131.
Ely, supra note 115, at 374.
Id. at 377.
See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 260–61 (1827) (sustaining the constitutionality
of a New York insolvency statute, as all parties impliedly assented to the conditions of the impairment).
Ely, supra note 115, at 376.
Cataldo, supra note 116, at 1145.
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879).
Olken, supra note 91, at 454 (“However, in Stone v. Mississippi, the Court unequivocally used inalienable police powers as the principal basis of its decision to sustain a state constitutional provision . . . in contravention of a previous state charter”).
See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
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pairments on its citizens’ contracts.130 As a result, Contracts Clause claims
are analyzed under a two-pronged test131 asking first whether a state’s law
creates a substantial impairment of existing constitutional relationships.132
If the court finds a substantial impairment, then it will next consider whether the impairment of a public contract was “reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose.”133 Courts ratchet up or down levels of
legislative deference based on a number of factors, including whether the
state is a party to the contract.134 For an example of this deference in practice, in Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago,135 the Seventh Circuit
upheld an Illinois law that altered the relationship between landlords and
tenants in Chicago. However, the court was heavily influenced by a few
factors not at issue here—the new law was to be applied prospectively rather than retroactively, and the court utilized lowered level of scrutiny because of the already heavy regulation in landlord-tenant law and the state
not being a party to the contracts.136 As a result, for constitutional purposes, it was rational to believe the law would lead to improved public health
and welfare. In instances in which the state is alleged to have impaired a
contract to which it is a party, the court will give less deference to a legislative determination of reasonableness and necessity, “because the State’s
self-interest is at stake.”137 Coupled with this fact, an exercise of the police
power that retroactively affects preexisting contracts is further “scrutinized
with suspicion,”138 leading to a compounding scrutiny that can make a
state’s laws subject to a very high threshold.
It is at this point in our analysis that the court’s “reasonable and necessary” prong set out in U.S. Trust becomes important.139 In its opinion, the
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Id. at 21.
Parella v. Ret. Bd. R.I. Emp.’s Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 1999). Occasionally, courts
state this test as a three part test, including the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Reserve Life Ins. Co.
v. LaFollette 323 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), but the factors in each test are essentially
the same. The third question simply further examines the effect of the law on appropriateness of
the public purpose of the original law.
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 21, 25; see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
434–40 (1934) (explaining the limitation on a state’s police power and the reserved power must
be construed in harmony).
US. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26 (“complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness
and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”)
Chicago Bd. Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 736–37.
Parella v. Ret. Bd. R.I. Emp.’s Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).
Veron, supra note 113, at 1979.
“As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment may be constitutional
if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In applying this standard,
however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.” U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25–26.
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Court found that the state’s “total” repeal of a covenant was a violation
since a less drastic modification was feasible, and total repeal was therefore
not necessary, especially since states will always have a reason to reduce
their own financial obligations, even if the given reason is an “important
public purpose.”140 Relying in part on its earlier El Paso holding, the Supreme Court used the expectations of the contracting parties as a basis for
reasonability.141 If the changes in perception of the state are of “degree and
not of kind,” then the impairments are unreasonable.142 This “reasonable
and necessary” prong has inspired circuit splits and conflicting opinions,143
with the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals employing
their own variations of this prong, while the Second Circuit strictly applying
the test from U.S. Trust.144 Most dangerously for Schwarcz’s model law, the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits give very little deference to state legislatures, and
construe their tests to further what they believe is the “spirit” of U.S.
Trust—resulting in continued invalidation of state action in a Contracts
Clause context.145
Some courts maintain that this dual standard, which places increased
scrutiny on public contracts, is misguided, particularly the Seventh Circuit,
who has held that “when a state repudiates a contract to which it is a party
it is doing nothing different from what a private party does when the party
repudiates a contract,” and correctly adds that “it would be absurd to turn
every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a violation of the
federal Constitution.”146 As this is the case, the crucial question becomes
whether or not the plaintiffs under Schwarcz’s law retain the right to recover damages for the breach of contract. If the state’s repudiation of its obligation extinguishes its duty to pay damages, then it will have impaired the
obligation of contract. A plaintiff would have to contend that they are
barred from recovering damages from the State as a result of the State’s
amendment of their bond contracts.147
At any rate, the lack of uniformity between federal circuits is a concern,
and the fact that U.S. Trust has created such a lack of guidance that those five
different circuits read its holding differently does not promote the legal feasibility of Schwarcz’s law. Instead, it raises a question about whether a state—
140
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Id. at 29–30.
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965) (relying on Blaisdell but did not make a
distinction between public and private contracts).
U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 32.
Cataldo, supra note 116, at 1159.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1165; see also Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir.
2003); Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 323 (6th Cir. 1998).
Horwitz-Matthrews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996).
Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 263, 286 (2011).
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even New York, which has a great interest in the proceedings—would enact
such a law before the circuit split is resolved by the Supreme Court.
C. State Authority to Enact a Subnational Insolvency Law
Putting Contracts Clause challenges aside, a second, almost equally important constitutional issue arises regarding the authority under which a
state could enact a restructuring or insolvency law on a subnational level.
Though Schwarcz only lightly addresses this topic (“New York’s enactment
of the model law should represent an exercise of New York’s police powers,
a quintessential state responsibility”),148 he frames it in a Contracts Clause
context. Perhaps a more logical move would be to justify the law’s enactment under the Bankruptcy Clause of the federal constitution, which has
long been considered a source of congressional power.149 The Constitution
overtly grants Congress the authority to regulate bankruptcy through this
often-ignored provision.150 This Clause is a particularly appealing basis for
enactment since the only times the Supreme Court has found an alreadyenacted bankruptcy law to exceed Congress’s power were in narrowly applicable cases, such as those that applied to only a single debtor, and therefore this constitutional provision should be read as one that expands power
rather than limits it.151
However, a historical approach analyzing both existing and defunct
American debtor laws in the United States shows how state innovation in
the bankruptcy arena can experience disfavor and hostility by the courts,
and the history of court decisions that led to the modern understanding of
the bankruptcy clause serve are evidence of the constitutional questions that
a subnational restructuring law would entail.152 Subnational insolvency
laws that apply only to one given state may not be constitutional generally
speaking, especially under the modern understanding of the Bankruptcy
Clause. To the extent that it is considered in modern constitutional scholarship, the Clause is viewed as part of a Hamiltonian effort, especially when
paired with the Commerce Clause and the Contracts Clause to work, to
operate federally and keep the states from piecemeal regulation.153
Early bankruptcy laws, which were on occasion enacted on state levels,
were responses to financial crises. For instance, The Supreme Court’s 1819
decision in Sturges v. Crowninshield154 struck down a New York bankruptcy
148
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Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 15 n.72.
Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 319, 353, 410,
411 (2013).
U.S. CONST.. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Lubben, supra note 149, at 411.
Id. at 410.
Lubben, supra note 149.
14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).

1228

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:5

law under the Contracts Clause, and serves a seminal case showing that
states did not have full authority to enact bankruptcy laws applying solely to
debtors within their jurisdictions. Instead, such power skews more federally, with the purpose of maintaining uniformity in insolvency proceedings
for debtors across state lines.155
All said, Lubben’s article and analysis lead to a conclusion that “[b]ased
on current precedents, the [Bankruptcy] Clause allows for a strong federal
power over all types of creditors . . . subject only to a weak internal requirement of uniformity.”156 In other words, an insolvency law that is not
in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause may need be one that can apply interstate, and allow for uniform treatment for creditors. Though it seems
easy enough, this would present issues for Schwarcz’s model law, as its current inception applies solely to the bonds held within New York’s own jurisdiction, and for those creditors contained within that state’s jurisdiction.
Enacting the model law across multiple state lines may offer a solution is
still a possibility, but as the vast majority of the restructured bonds would be
held in New York, it seems unlikely that another state would be compelled
to consider passing the law at all.
D. Continuing Difficulties with Liquidation Analysis and Unconstitutional Contract
Impairment
This is not to say that every subnational, state-enacted insolvency law is
preempted or barred by the Bankruptcy Code, as those instances under
which Congress does not exercise its constitutional bankruptcy power,
states may enact laws addressing debtors’ rights, so long as they “do not unconstitutionally impair contractual obligations.”157 This was firmly established in the Supreme Court case Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury
Park, in which a state law restructuring of city debt was seen as constitutionally permissible. Taking place prior to the enactment of the federal adoption of the bankruptcy code, this state law restructurings was permissible.158
Here, the court reasoned that the city’s restructuring was commenced in
New Jersey state court prior to there being a federal bankruptcy alternative
in existence at the time.159
Obviously, since a federal restructuring law for municipalities now exists
through Chapter 9 of the Code,160 the above case, which addresses a city’s
155
156
157
158
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160

See Lubben, supra note 149, at 319 (“Congress’s powers regarding insolvency were simply to impose uniformity”).
Id. at 410.
Martin J. Bienenstock & Andrea G. Miller, Analyzing the Contracts Clause’s Impact on State Law Restructurings, N.Y. L.J. (Online), Sept. 14, 2015.
See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
Id. at 508.
See 11 U. S. C. § 9.
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restructuring, would face a preemption argument today. However, because
a similar federal mechanism does not exist for a sovereign state, then under
this analysis a state’s sovereign debt restructuring law would not be unconstitutional on its face. Instead, it would need to be analyzed in the same
fashion as those restructuring laws that exist independently of federal insolvency laws—most notably, those for insurance companies and other
banks.161 In the United States, “[i]nsurance company insolvencies are not
handled under the Bankruptcy Code but are governed by state insurance
receivership laws and regulations.”162
In an insurance and state banks legislation context, the Contracts
Clause does not function as a strict bar for those states seeking to pass restructuring laws addressing these debt obligations, but serves mainly as a
prohibition against those kinds of legislation that “materially reduc[e] the
value of a contractual obligation” in the absence of a police power exception.163 Under this reasoning, a state is permitted to enact some legislation
that could restructure the debt of entities such as banks and insurance companies so long as the law preserves, for creditors, the values that they can
obtain enforcing such entities’ obligations.164 “The recurring theme in these decisions is that the value of the contractual obligation is not unconstitutionally impaired if the creditors receive at least what they would receive if
they enforced their claims.”165
Similar to these insurance and state bank insolvency laws, sovereign
debt restructuring mechanisms, even those enacted on a statewide level,
would probably not be wholly prohibited by the Bankruptcy Clause, which
is silent on the topic. However, the larger issue is a persisting Contracts
Clause challenge that arises when attempting to prove that a creditor would
receive just as much value for his/her claims in a restructuring as he/she
would in liquidation. This cannot be shown for a sovereign, as it cannot
have a typical liquidation in the way that a corporation could, through exhaustive asset sales.
This highlights a key constitutional distinction: one between permissible
debt enforcement laws and those laws discharging debtors from maintaining their debts on their after-acquired property.166 A constitutional state
restructuring law that addresses only corporations or similar entities can allow those corporation-debtors to liquidate through selling assets and leaving
161
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See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 723, 727–32 (1998) (discussing the multitude and divergences of state and federal banking
and insurance regulatory bodies).
Francine L. Semaya & William K. Broudy, A Primer on Insurance Receiverships, BRIEF, Fall 2010, at
22.
Bienenstock & Miler, supra note 157.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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a shell after distributions to creditors, and such a law can exist with the sole
purpose of organizing debt payment without permitting a discharge. For
an individual seeking restructuring under a similar law, such sales processes
does not exist, and any future acquired property would need to be discharged from existing debts.167 As a result, creditors’ rights are always impaired in the case of personal discharges from debt, as “in the absence of
property the personal obligation to pay constitutes the only value of the
debt.”168 In this respect, a sovereign is like an individual, as a restructuring
would necessarily need to take the place of a discharge, rather than liquidation, and places debtor-states into the same murky constitutional territory.
IV. POSSIBLE COUNTERARGUMENTS TO CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
This section seeks to further engage with the legal feasibility of the model law in a hypothetical scenario, particularly if the model law is passed by
New York. Proponents of the law would likely raise two arguments—first,
that even if creditors sought recourse against the state, they would have no
legal mechanism to do so, and second, that if a court ever heard such a
claim, the dire economic situation that necessitated the law’s enactment
would overrule the interests of any creditors on policy grounds. Both of these claims are explored in detail, and ultimately refuted, below.
A. Creditors Lack a Legal Mechanism for Enforcing Their Rights
Even if repudiation of a bond is seen as entirely unconstitutional under
the Contracts Clause, the question remains as to whether the bondholders
have any prospect of a remedy—in particular, it seems unlikely that a state
court would grant these unpopular bondholders any recovery against the
very state the court sits in, and sovereign immunity for a state, coupled with
the Eleventh Amendment’s penumbra, usually bars federal question suits
predicated on the Contracts Clause.169 Despite this hurdle, there are certain avenues with which federal court suits could nonetheless continue.170
The burden of proof in a Contracts Clause context is a significant question, and in a typical case, it falls upon the party asserting the Contracts
Clause violation, who will need to show that no reasonable interpretation of
the facts would justify the exercise.171 A claim that state alteration of a debt
contract’s payment terms violated the Contracts Clause is a federal claim
167
168
169
170
171

See id. at 3.
See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187–88 (1902) (internal quotation omitted).
Johnson & Young, supra note 90, at 150.
Id. at 148–52 (suggesting two possible avenues including waiver of immunity, which already exists
in may state law bond obligations or statutory abrogation of state immunity).
Shepard v. Skaneateles, 89 N.E.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. 1949).
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under the Constitution, not a state contract claim. “Commentators and
judges generally agree that the Eleventh Amendment’s textual bar does not
extend to federal question suits. . . . [and] federal courts may issue prospective
relief—that is, injunctions and declaratory judgments—against state officers
who are alleged to be acting in violation of the U.S. Constitution.”172 “This
may permit certain challenges to IOU’s: a creditor might sue, for instance,
to enjoin the issuance of IOUs that arguably impair the obligation of the
underlying debt instruments.”173
Unlike other constitutional violations, there is some dispute over whether
claims for Contracts Clause violations can permissibly function procedurally
as civil rights claims under § 1983,174 which allows for a procedural vehicle
absent substantive law, including for federal Contracts Clause violations.175
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “Section 1983 provides no
basis to complain of an alleged impairment” and can be utilized in a Contracts Clause only as a direct constitutional challenge—in other words, when
a state has foreclosed the imposition of an adequate remedy for an established impairment, but not as a means of indirectly claiming that the government is merely contravening the Constitution, even if that contravention
led to a deprivation of rights typically protected by § 1983.176 In other
words, the acts of the state would need to rise to the level of a constitutional
impairment of obligation, rather than a mere breach of contract.177
Practically speaking, if there is a Contracts Clause violation, there are
questions concerning the remedy that a state employee would be entitled
to.178 Even if the model law does amount to a Contracts Clause violation, it
may not even matter, since the creditors will likely be left without a remedy,
thus disincentivizing them to bring a lawsuit. Creditors and beneficiaries
will then remain unable to force actual payment on the original debtor or
obligation, as the general structure of state sovereign immunity law is designed to prevent courts from compelling payment on debts that threaten
172
173
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Johnson & Young, supra note 90, at 135–36.
Id.
See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress”).
James P. McMahon, Section 1983 Causes of Action Under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 467, 468 (2014) (“When a government passes an ordinance that retroactively infringes on a private party’s contractual rights, the private party often seeks redress under
the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Many times, these plaintiffs attempt to bring a
claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 authorizes redress for the deprivation of ‘any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution’ . . . [and] provides plaintiffs with
powerful benefits not available when vindicating contractual rights though other methods.”)
Secunda, supra note 147, at 286.
Id. at 286.
Johnson & Young, supra note 90, at 135.
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the financial viability of the states.179 Further, “[t]he Supreme Court has
interpreted [the Constitution] to impose significant constraints on retroactive legislation affecting property rights” yet “paying some state obligations
by short-term IOUs, however, may well be insufficiently serious to trigger
those protections.”180
That being said, “the law rarely cuts off all remedies,”181 and this, coupled with the fact that creditors currently engage in holdout behavior at the
detriment of their fellow creditors shows how tactics in a restructuring context may not be based entirely in logic or payoffs. If an arguable vehicle for
a lawsuit exists, and creditors can arguably take advantage of it, then there
is some member of a group of creditors who will likely attempt to utilize it.
Especially since, as this paper has shown, there are, at the very least some
questions about the constitutionality of this particular model law. As a result, these threats of unconstitutionality can call into serious question the
willingness of governments outside of New York to enact such a law. Particularly in the United States, in the case of an actual insolvency, these constitutionality concerns would have the potential to undermine the practical
benefits of the model law. If creditors would always raise an unconstitutionality argument, such a law would likely not be adopted on a national or
subnational level before it has the opportunity to be tested, and approved,
by the Supreme Court.
B. Courts Should Strike Down Creditor Claims on Policy Grounds
Though opponents may disagree, on policy grounds it is hard to maintain that the constitutional questions would weigh in favor of the state passage of the restructuring law. Instead, a questioning court should correctly
recognize how the emergency powers exception is one of many examples of
“extra-constitutional responses to economic crises” that “may ultimately
degrade liberty interests more than extra-constitutional responses to violent
crises.”182 Because those factors present during economic crisis—and in
governmental solutions to economic crisis—tend to provoke judicial responses that gradually integrate into non-emergency constitutionalism,
there is a greater danger that emergency-based encroachments on economic liberty will become entrenched in our legal system than those emergencybased encroachments on civil liberty.183 Thus, it is important to consider
these more subtle encroachments of federal power on economic liberty, and
prevent them when they appear contested in a courtroom.
179
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Id. at 136.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 162.
Kahan, supra note 93, at 1280.
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Further, a competing policy argument weighing in favor of opponents to
the law is an originalism one, which would ultimately lead to a strengthening
of the Contracts Clause. If courts are able to have unlimited reign to judge
the “necessity” of contracts, this may run afoul of the original intent of the
Framers, who clearly intended the goal of the Clause to promote stability for
both the state and private parties entering a contract.184 The Contracts
Clause was originally concerned with individualized credit laws, and sought
to prevent inconsistent and unstable commercial transactions.185 The Framers, as expressed through ratification of the Clause, believed that fairness was
inherent only in the bargaining process, and allowing states to effectively abrogate this process would result in discord.186 As the law is constantly in flux
and subject to questions about whether it is a dead letter, when one of these
cases arises in a courtroom it is in the judge’s best interest to affirm its power, and the intent of the Framers, through his or her ruling.
V. TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE: A LAW OF
RECOGNITION
Rather than having New York adopt the law wholesale, the state may
be able to adopt a law of recognition, one that says that New York will recognize a foreign sovereign debt restructuring, but under certain criteria that
would make it comport with the emergency powers exception. This will
especially be true if England is able and willing to adopt the law on its
own—although this would result in the fading of New York law in the international monetary arena. This law of recognition may also limit the
standing of creditors to bring suit, including under a 1984 claim as expressed above, since the state would not be the one impairing their claims.
Of course, a problem with a law of recognition is one of plausibility—
why would any state or subnational entity pass a law of recognition without
any real interest in the restructuring of the debts of anther sovereign nation? This idea of support and recognition by U.S. subnational becomes all
the more unlikely when considering how prevalent English law, at the expense of American law, would become internationally.
Further, there is a legal question that persists for Contracts Clause purposes about whether recognizing a foreign judgment can functionally serve
as a constitutional workaround. Seeing as New York would be refusing to
enforce New York law contracts based on recognition of the English law,
creditors could make a plausible argument that even a recognition obligation in this context, though it is one step removed from state level courts,
might nonetheless violate the clause. A law of recognition functions to di184
185
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See Cataldo, supra note 116, at 1179.
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See Veron, supra note 113, at 158.
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rectly enforce foreign judgments as domestic ones,187 and though “recognition” differs from “enforcement,” the state is nonetheless seeking to domesticate this judgment in the eyes of the U.S. Courts and treat it the same as
other state decisions that benefit from Full Faith & Credit.188 Functionally
speaking, the recognition is serving to produce the same effect and have the
same authority as a case originally decided in the subnational jurisdiction.189 This may undermine the state’s ability to pass a law recognizing
such English judgments, as an enforcing U.S. court can only accept a foreign judgment when there is no reason why comity of the United States
should not be given to the foreign judgment,190 and unconstitutionality of a
restructuring under the Contracts Clause can certainly open a judgment up
to the same challenges that it would receive if effected in a U.S. court.
Though it creates a convoluted pathway and likely will exhaust certain
creditors seeking enforcement, it is hard to see why, functionally, a subnational law of recognition would substantively differ from the initial plan for
a state sanctioned model law.
CONCLUSION
As recent international fiscal crises have shown, the issues of sovereign
debt are of increasing importance, especially because of the interconnectedness of the financial markets and the bailout-driven “moral hazard” incentives. Further, the contract-based approach results in inconsistencies
and, even if radical changes and uniformity are brought about in CACs, the
ultimate results are a long time away. In the meantime, creditor states
would still face real collective action problems. In any event, the need for a
consistent, predictable mechanism with which to restructure sovereign debt
in the event of a default has become more of a necessity rather than the academic thought experiment that it once was. Of course, in the United
States, the balance between constitutional rights and efficient, sustainable
economic solutions will become a major factor, particularly when laws are
implemented on a state level.
As the wealth of legal scholarship leading to Schwarcz’s proposal has
shown, the issue surrounding selecting the correct statutory mechanism is
complicated, and designing the ultimate law even more so. Although this
paper is meant to show the benefits of choosing a statutory approach to sov187
188
189
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Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do
We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 155 (2013).
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Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895). See also Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict:
Reinstating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 UNIV. OF CA. DAVIS L. REV. 12, 14 (noting
how comity encourages a court’s deference to a foreign sovereign and requires a balance of various public, private, and international factors when determining if comity is due).
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ereign debt, it is also meant to provide a map of some of the constitutional
legal issues that can arise with a subnational statutory solution. Hopefully,
the issues and solutions that it offers are some that scholars and legislatures
can incorporate into their future proposals, and therefore strengthen everyone in the quest to achieve more durable, reliable solutions.
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